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Abstract:	 This	paper	 analyses	 the	different	ways	 that	 international	 law	 regulates	 the	 entry	of	foreign	 investments.	By	comparing	 the	provisions	 in	 the	regimes	of	 trade	and	 investment	 law,	this	paper	argues	that	there	 is	more	 liberalization	in	 investment	treaties	and	more	investment	regulation	 in	 the	GATS	than	commonly	 thought.	Different	clauses	reflect	 the	varied	techniques	used	 to	 regulate	 the	 entry	 of	 foreign	 investments	 and	 investors	 in	 services.	 No	 matter	 how	divergent	 the	 goals	 of	 trade	 and	 investment	 treaties	 may	 be,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 entry	 of	investments	 and	 investors,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 their	 provisions	 leads	 to	particularly	 similar	 results.	The	 concept	of	 commercial	 presence	 in	 the	GATS	 includes	 aspects	equivalent	 to	 the	 so-called	 establishment	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investments.	 The	 interpretation	 of	GATS	 rules	 as	 covering	 potential	 service	 suppliers	 bear	 a	 resemblance	 to	 concepts	 already	present	 in	 BIT	 practice	 in	 relation	 to	 investors	 that	 seek	 to	 invest.	 Therefore,	 there	 are	 some	signs	of	an	increasing	conceptual	and	substantive	convergence	of	rules.	The	way	the	admission	clauses	 evolved	 to	 establishment	 clauses	 in	 some	 treaties	 shows	 that	 the	 difference	 between	them,	 while	 less	 radical	 and	 of	 limited	 practical	 relevance,	 may	 indicate	 a	 step	 towards	 a	convergence	with	international	trade	law.	There	has	also	been	a	trend	towards	treaty	language	granting	more	entry	rights	and	commitments.	This	was	done	by	the	progressive	introduction	of	national	 treatment	 for	 entry	 rights,	 the	 expansion	 of	 services	 coverage	 in	 Mode	 3	 and	 the	recognition	and	clarification	of	 the	 rights	 to	potential	 investors.	The	 increasing	number	of	 ITs	containing	establishment	rights	is	noted	especially	in	light	of	the	new	mega-regionals.	There	has	also	been	a	disposition	to	 include	provisions	related	to	the	entry	of	 investors	coming	from	the	international	 trade	 law	 world	 into	 the	 investment	 law	 arena.	 In	 sum,	 the	 substantive	convergence	 of	 the	 rules	 related	 to	 entry	 of	 investments	 in	 treaty-making	 is	 becoming	 more	evident.	
Keywords:	 International	 Investment	Law,	 International	Trade	Law,	WTO,	GATS,	Entry	Rights,	Establishment,	Admission								
																																																								1	Doctoral	(PhD)	candidate	and	fellow	at	the	Faculty	of	Laws	of	University	College	London.	He	has	been	an	exchange	 scholar	 at	 Yale	University	 as	 visiting	 assistant	 in	 research	 (2016).	 CAPES	Foundation	 (Brazil)	Scholar	-	Process	0738-14-0.	Email:	uctlmul@ucl.ac.uk	





















	 This	paper	analyses	the	content	of	the	international	rules	regulating	the	entry2	of	foreign	 investments,	 with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 the	 services	 sector.	 The	 focus	 on	entry	is	explained	by	the	great	potential	for	substantive	overlap	between	rules	of	trade	and	investment	law	in	this	regard.	In	general	terms,	international	trade	is	about	access,	and	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 investment	 law	 regulates	 the	 entry	 of	 investments,	 it	 also	regulates	access.																																																									2	The	 paper	 uses	 the	 term	 “entry”	 as	 a	 general,	 all-encompassing	 term,	 broader	 than	 the	more	 specific	terms	“admission”,	“establishment”,	“commercial	presence”	and	“access”.	
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The	interrelation	between	international	trade	law	and	investment	 law	has	been	highlighted	by	recent	academic	literature.3	It	has	been	noted	that	government	regulation	progressively	affects	both	trade	and	investment	flows	and	that	the	growing	convergence	between	 trade	 and	 investment	 will	 probably	 not	 be	 reversed.4	Strong	 convergence	 is	evident	when	the	same	economic	activity	fulfils	both	definitions	in	trade	and	investment	treaties.5	Thus,	 differences	 in	 adjudication	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 “accident	 of	 legal	 history”6.	Some	 identify	 progressive	 trend	 of	 convergence	 in	 the	 discourse	 and	 case	 law,	 when	comparing	the	regulatory	space.7	Some	even	claim	that	the	convergence	should	lead	to	a	rethinking	 of	 investment	 and	 trade	 law	 as	 merged	 systems,	 part	 of	 an	 emerging	international	economic	law	regime.8		Others	 are	 more	 cautious.	 Some	 underline	 that	 the	 conceptual	 differences	between	 trade	 and	 investment	 explain	 the	 different	 regulations,	 each	 responding	 to	particular	policy	purposes	and	challenges.9	There	have	been	critiques	of	the	reliance	on	arguments	raised	during	dispute	settlement	in	the	World	Trade	Organisation	-	WTO	to	solve	 investment	cases,	on	grounds	of	 legitimacy.10	The	criticism	focuses	on	the	undue	transplantation	 of	 interpretations,	 approaches	 and	 solutions	 from	 trade	 law	 to	investment	 law	 and	 underline	 the	 broader	mandate	 of	WTO	 tribunals	 and	 the	 wider	flexibility	 of	 WTO	 treaty	 language.11	Some	 emphasise	 the	 deep	 normative	 differences	underlying	the	systems	and	claim	that	cross-fertilization	will	remain	limited,	so	that	the	convergence	is	far	from	real.12	It	has	been	argued	there	is	nothing	wrong	in	having	two	regimes	challenging	the	same	 measures13	and	 competing	 for	 the	 best	 regulatory	 approach.14	These	 kinds	 of	




norms	 are	 a	 fact	 of	 international	 law	 and	 a	 facet	 of	 its	 fragmentation,15	a	 view	 that	supports	 a	 pluralist	 account.16	Anyway,	 some	 aspects	 of	 these	 international	 rules	regulating	 the	 entry	 of	 investments	 may	 constitute	 what	 has	 been	 labelled	 as	 multi-sourced	equivalent	norms.	In	this	regard,	it	should	be	noted	that:		Even	 if	 norms	 expressed	 in	 different	 rules	 of	 international	 law	 have	 similar	 or	
identical	 content,	 they	 may	 have	 different	 conditions	 of	 creation,	 application	 or	termination	 and	 different	 institutions	 and	 mechanisms	 that	 ensure	 their	implementation.17	There	has	been,	though,	a	recognition	that	when	treaty-practice	has	consciously	and	clearly	incorporated	WTO	trade	provisions	within	investment	agreements	there	is	a	need	to	refer	to	WTO	case	law.18	In	fact,	some	aspects	of	the	bifurcation	are	difficult	to	justify,	 since	 the	 historical	 and	 political	 causes	 for	 it	 may	 have	 disappeared.19	This	remark	applies	particularly	to	the	area	of	investments	in	services,	as	will	be	shown.	Issues	 of	 the	 interpretation	 of	 fundamental	 concepts	 have	 arisen	 in	 both	investment	 and	 trade	 treaties.20	The	 paper	 will	 deal,	 firstly,	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 entry	expressed	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 admission	 and	 the	 qualified	 obligation	 to	 admit	 in	 the	practice	 of	 traditional	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 –	 BITs	 –	 or,	 more	 generally	investment	treaties	–	ITs.	It	will	do	so	by	analysing	the	evolution	of	the	interpretation	of	treaty	 clauses	 governing	 states`	 rights	 and	 obligations	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 admission	 of	investments.	 Subsequently,	 it	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 establishment,	 another	concept	expressing	entry.	The	paper	 includes	an	overview	of	 the	US	BIT	model	and	of	the	 practice	 of	 the	 North	 American	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 –	 NAFTA.21	It	 will	 briefly	comment	on	recent	trends	towards	establishment	rights	and	obligations.	The	 following	 section	 will	 cover	 entry	 of	 investments	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	concepts	 of	 commercial	 presence,	 market	 access	 and	 discrimination	 of	 the	 General	Agreement	of	Trade	in	Services	(GATS)22,	with	a	focus	on	service	suppliers.	Finally,	the																																																																																																																																																																														14	Christian	 Tietje,	 ‘Perspectives	 on	 the	 Interaction	 between	 International	 Trade	 and	 Investment	Regulation’	 in	World	Trade	Forum	(ed),	Prospects	in	International	Investment	Law	and	Policy	 (CUP	2013)	171.	15	Study	 Group	 of	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission,	 ‘Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	arising	 from	 the	Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	 International	 Law’,	 Draft	 Conclusions	 –	 Appendix	 	 (2	May	2006)	UN	Doc	A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1		paras	11-16.	16	For	 a	 critique,	 see	 Jürgen	Kurtz,	 ‘On	 the	Evolution	 and	Slow	Convergence	of	 International	Trade	 and	Investment	 Law’	 in	 Giorgio	 Sacerdoti	 and	 others	 (eds),	 General	 Interests	of	Host	States	 in	 International	








A) General	International	Law		 Before	 addressing	 the	 concept	 of	 admission,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 briefly	 explore	 the	backdrop	 of	 international	 law	 in	 the	 area.	While	 there	 is	 a	 general	 duty	 for	 States	 to	admit	 their	 own	 nationals	 into	 their	 territory,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 general	 rule	 that	obliges	a	state	to	grant	access	to	a	foreign	individual	or	entity.	23	A	state	cannot	claim	the	absolute	 right	 of	 its	 nationals	 to	 enter	 into	 or	 reside	 on	 the	 territory	 of	 any	 foreign	state.24	A	 state	has	 great	discretionary	powers	 to	 accept	 foreigners	 and	 allow	 them	 to	perform	economic	activities	in	its	territory.25	By	treaty,	however,	a	state	may	impose	on	itself	 the	 obligation	 not	 only	 of	 the	 entry	 of	 foreigners	 but	 also	 of	 the	 settlement	 of	business	activities.26		In	 the	context	of	 foreign	 investments,	 all	 the	general	observations	above	apply.	The	right	of	the	state	to	prohibit,	control	or	allow	entry	of	foreign	investors	arises	from	a	dimension	 of	 sovereignty.27	There	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 general	 legal	 obligation	 on	 the	matter	 of	 admission	 of	 investments	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 customary	 international	law.28	Thus,	 there	 is	 consensus	 that	 each	 state	 is	 fully	 sovereign	 to	 admit	 investments																																																																																																																																																																														Negotiations	284	(1999),	1869	UNTS	183	(GATS).	23	Guy	 S	 Goodwin-Gill,	 International	Law	and	the	Movement	of	Persons	between	States	 (Clarendon	 Press	1978)	136–137.;	Nottebohm	Case	(Liechtenstein	v	Guatemala)	(Dissenting	Opinion	by	Judge	Read)	[1955]	ICJ	Rep	4,	46	24	Robert	Yewdall	Jennings,	Oppenheim’s	International	Law	(9th	ed,	Longman	1992)	897;	Goodwin-Gill	(n	23)	196.	25	Dominique	Carreau,	Patrick	Juillard	and	Thiébaut	Flory,	Droit	International	économique	(2	éd	refondue	et	augm,	Librairie	générale	de	droit	et	de	jurisprudence	1980)	444.	26	Goodwin-Gill	(n	23)	160–197;	Jennings	(n	24)	898.	27	Anna	 Joubin-Bret,	 ‘Admission	 and	 Establishment	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 Investment	 Protection’	 in	 August	Reinisch	 (ed),	Standards	of	Investment	Protection	 (OUP	2008)	10;	Giorgio	Sacerdoti,	 ‘The	Admission	and	Treatment	of	Foreign	 Investment	under	Recent	Bilateral	and	Regional	Treaties’	 (2000)	1	The	 Journal	of	World	Investment	&	Trade	105,	105;	Rudolf	Dolzer	and	Christoph	H	Schreuer,	Principles	of	International	
Investment	Law	 (2nd	ed,	OUP	2012)	88;	M	Sornarajah,	The	International	Law	on	Foreign	Investment	 (3rd	ed,	CUP	2010)	88.	28	Ibrahim	 FI	 Shihata,	 ‘Recent	 Trends	 Relating	 to	 Entry	 of	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investment’	 (1994)	 9	 ICSID	Review	47.	
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and	set	the	conditions	for	their	admission.	But	the	definition	of	the	exact	features	of	this	inherent	 right	 is	 essential	 to	 provide	 the	 background	 in	 which	 states	 operate	 in	 the	absence	of	mutual	commitments.	The	admission	does	not	apparently	require	justification	or	reasoning	and	appears	to	 be	 at	 the	 state`s	 own	 convenience.	While,	 ideally,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 a	 feature	 that	should	 guide	 all	 internal	 actions	 of	 the	 state,	 its	 precise	 characteristics	 at	 the	international	 level	 are	 not	 fully	 defined.	29	One	 might	 say	 that	 a	 state	 may	 admit	 an	investment	 even	 if	 it	 is	 prohibited	under	 its	 domestic	 regulations	or	deny	 it	 even	 if	 it	should	be	allowed.		This	may	 be	 tempered	 by	 considerations	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith,	which	is	not	a	rule,	but	can	be	perhaps	understood	as	a	limitation	on	a	State’s	external	sovereignty.	30	Good	 faith	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 cases	 of	 state	 unilateral	 acts	 strongly	encouraging	or	granting	admission,	followed	by	an	unjustified	refusal,	when	actual	entry	is	 attempted.31	The	 writings	 of	 classical	 authors	 already	 indicated	 a	 more	 nuanced	approach,	 suggesting	 perhaps	 a	 relative	 right	 of	 settlement	 to	 exercise	 economic	activities	in	a	foreign	territory	and	the	need	to	justify	a	refusal.32	Another	 aspect	 of	 the	 right	 becomes	 evident	 if	 the	 reasons	 for	 non-entry	 or	discrimination	breach	rules	which	have	been	considered	as	jus	cogens.	33	One	example	is	racial	prejudice.34	While	state	practice	indicates	a	degree	of	recognition	of	discretion	in	that	regard,35	the	principle	of	non-discrimination	on	racial	grounds	exerts	a	limit	on	the	





Principles	of	the	Law	of	Nature	Applied	to	the	Conduct	and	Affairs	of	Nations	and	Sovereigns	 (New	edn	corr,	tr	from	the	French,	G	G	J	and	J	Robinson	1793)	35–39;	134;	156–160;	167–168;	171;	173.	33	Corfu	 Channel	 Case	 (UK	 v	 Albania)	 (Merits)	 [1949]	 ICJ	 Rep	 4	 p	 22;	 Legality	 of	 the	 Threat	 or	 Use	 of	
Nuclear	Weapons	 (Advisory	 Opinion)	 [1996]	 ICJ	 Rep	 226	 para	 79;	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	Treaties	(entered	into	force	27	January	1980)	1155	UNTS	331	(VCLT)	art	53.	
34	Case	Concerning	 the	Barcelona	Traction,	Light	and	Power	Company,	Limited	(Belgium	v	Spain)	 (Second	Phase)	 [1970]	 ICJ	 Rep	 3	 para	 34;	 Case	 Concerning	 Armed	 Activities	 on	 the	 Territory	 of	 the	 Congo	




state's	 decision-making	 power.36 	It	 is	 to	 be	 accepted	 that	 blatant	 acts	 against	prospective	 investors,	which	are	arbitrary	and	unjustified,	 that	 is,	motivated	 solely	by	racial	discrimination	and	lacking	objective	justification37	are	to	be	considered	unlawful	and	prohibited	under	general	international	law.	In	any	case,	the	establishment	of	permanent	presence	and	settlement	of	foreign	businesspeople	 and	 foreign	 investors	 has	 been	 historically	 granted	 by	 formal	agreements.38	The	 right	 to	 remain	 and	 engage	 in	 business	 activities	 granted	 by	 early	Friendship,	Commerce	and	Navigation	Treaties	–	FCNs	encompassed	 the	settlement	of	some	form	of	 investments,	such	as	warehouses.39	It	 is	 important	 to	point	out	 that	FCN	treaties,	unlike	BITs,	were	often	concluded	between	capital	exporting	countries.40	At	the	beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 a	 right	 of	 settlement	 in	 relation	 to	 industry	(manufacturing	 and	mining)	 started	 to	 be	 present	 in	 treaties,	mainly	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	non-discrimination	principle.41		
	
B) Typical	Clauses	
	 The	 main	 instruments	 to	 promote	 obligations	 of	 admission	 are	 treaties	negotiated	by	states	by	which	they	commit	themselves	to	accept	those	investments.	The	so-called	admission	model,	or	investment-control	model,	is	followed	by	the	majority	of	BITs	 and	 has	 been	 characterised	 as	 reserving	 to	 the	 host	 state	 the	 discretion	 to	 set	admission	 procedures	 and	 the	 conditions	 of	 entry,	 which	 may	 change	 from	 time	 to	time.42	The	 full	 flexibility	 has	 been	 interpreted	 to	 allow	 for	 discretion	 to	 carry	 out	national	development	goals.43		Several	 policy	 and	 economic	 arguments	 support	 this	 approach	 and	 a	 good	number	 of	 them	 also	 refute	 it.44	They	 are	 not	 going	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 here,	 since	 they	represent	 choices	 resulting	 from	 political	 processes	 and	 economic	 realities.	 But	 the	absence	 of	 any	 international	 commitments	 may	 indicate	 a	 lack	 of	 will	 to	 attract																																																									36	Guy	 S	 Goodwin-Gill,	 International	Law	and	the	Movement	of	Persons	between	States	 (Clarendon	 Press	1978)	187–188;	196;	Randolph	John	Nogel,	‘Human	Rights	and	Uganda’s	Expulsion	of	Its	Asian	Minority’	(1973)	3	Denver	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy	107,	105.		








expression,	 one	 starting	 point	 would	 be	 to	 mention	 the	 definitions	 below	 from	dictionaries.	This	technique	has	been	resorted	to	in	Churchill:58	In	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 of	 treaty	 interpretation,	 the	 Tribunal	 will	 start	 by	ascertaining	 the	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 the	 terms	 of	 Article	 2(1).	 ...	According	to	the	
Oxford	Dictionary	of	English,	the	verb	“to	admit”	means	“to	allow”	or	“to	accept”.	That	
same	 dictionary	 defines	 the	 noun	 “admission”	 as	 “the	 process	 or	 fact	 of	 entering	 or	
being	allowed	to	enter	a	place	or	organization”.	More	 specialized	 dictionaries	 bring	 the	 following	 definition	 to	 “admitted	corporation”:	 “A	corporation	 licensed	or	authorized	 to	do	business	within	a	particular	state.	–	Also	termed	qualified	corporation;	corporation	qualified	to	do	business.”59	This	 kind	 of	 language	 has	 been	 taken	 for	 granted	 and	 interpreted	 as	unnecessary.60	However,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 first	 section,	 customary	 law	 also	 allows	 for	arbitrary	and	non-reasoned	decisions,	perhaps	 tempered	by	 jus	cogens	 and	good	 faith.	Admission	clauses	are	not	merely	a	reinstatement	of	customary	international	law,	since	the	discretion	is	to	be	exercised	within	the	framework	of	the	law	and	not	on	the	basis	of	a	 frivolous	 decision.61	Sacerdoti	 correctly	 recognises	 the	 progress	 of	 this	 language	 in	comparison	 with	 previous	 expressions	 focusing	 on	 the	 conformity	 with	 national	development	policies	and	underlining	specific	procedures.62	Vandevelde	recognises	that	the	provision	is	not	without	effect	since:	It	incorporates	local	law	with	respect	to	establishment	into	the	BIT	so	that	a	failure	by	the	host	state	to	adhere	to	its	own	law	violates	the	BIT	...	Thus,	while	the	host	state	may	change	its	law	at	any	time,	it	must	adhere	to	its	own	law	until	such	time	as	that	law	has	been	changed.63	The	 unqualified	 nature	 or	 extent	 of	 the	 reference	 to	 legislation	 is	 to	 be	understood	as	its	existence	from	time	to	time,	not	only	at	the	time	of	the	conclusion	of	the	BIT	but	also	subsequently.64		The	host	state	 is	 free	to	review	its	 laws	after	 the	BIT	has	 entered	 into	 force.65	It	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that	 a	 “denial	 of	 admission	 or	 its	




C) Rescuing	an	Interpretation		 	Despite	being	explicitly	referenced	in	BIT`s	preambles,	the	goal	of	promotion	and,	when	present,	liberalisation	of	investments	has	been	commonly	described	as	subsidiary	to	the	protection	granted	to	investments	and	as	a	natural	consequence	thereof.67	But	the	discussion	of	access	to	 investments	raises	the	 issue	that	the	focus	on	protection	 in	the	interpretation	of	BITs	is	perhaps	overshadowing	the	ordinary	meaning	of	entry	clauses,	such	as	admission	and	establishment,	as	will	be	seen.	In	international	investment	case	law,	most	of	the	discussion	on	the	legal	concept	of	 admission/authorization	 has	 been	 relevant	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 context.	 The	objective	has	been	to	check	whether	an	 investment	 is	covered	and	protected	by	a	BIT,	that	is,	if	it	was	regularly	“admitted”.68	Some	argue	that	the	admission	clause	acts	as	a	filter	to	the	protection	by	the	BIT,	preventing	illegal	or	unlawful	investments	from	being	protected.69	This	draws	on	a	line	of	 awards	 in	 cases	 such	 as	Salini,70	Tokios	Tokeles,71	Bayindir72	and	 Inceysa.73	However,	some	 arguments	 used	 to	 base	 decisions	 in	 these	 and	 other	 investment	 arbitration	cases74	indicate	 an	 increasing	 recognition	 that	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 or	 similar	clauses,	 illegal	 investments	 are	 not	 to	 be	 protected.75		 An	 approach	 based	 on	 general	principles	is	fully	capable	of	excluding	those	investments.																																																										67	For	a	discussion	of	the	origins	and	aims	of	BITs,	see	Kenneth	J	Vandevelde,	‘The	Economics	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties’	(2000)	41	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	469.	68	For	a	recent	decision	that	denies	jurisdiction	for	the	lack	of	an	“admitted”	investment,	see	Philip	Morris	








Vandevelde	correctly	points	out	that	tribunals	“have	interpreted	a	provision	that	purports	 to	 expand	 investor	 rights	 as	 actually	 imposing	 a	 limitation	 on	 them.”76	It	 is	submitted	that	the	correct	way	to	assign	meaning	to	the	admission	clauses,	as	developed	above,	 is	 to	 consider	 it	 as	 the	 qualification	 of	 the	 obligation	 of	 the	 state	 to	 act	 in	accordance	 with	 its	 own	 regulations.	 In	 Aguas	 de	 Tunari,	 the	 discussion	 developed	around	 one	 objection	 to	 jurisdiction	 raised	 by	 Bolivia:	 that	 the	 language	 used	 in	 the	admission	clause	prevented	 ICSID	 jurisdiction.	The	second	sentence	of	Article	2	of	 the	BIT	between	Bolivia	and	the	Netherlands	reads:	“Subject	to	its	right	to	exercise	powers	conferred	 by	 its	 laws	 or	 regulations,	 each	 Contracting	 Party	 shall	 admit	 such	investments.”	The	 language	 makes	 reference	 to	 “rights	 to	 exercise	 powers”,	 which,	 to	 some	commentators,	means	a	“positive	right	to	admit	investments”.77	The	Tribunal	said:	147.	As	to	the	second	sentence,	the	Tribunal	observes	that	if	it	omits	the	reference	to	Bolivian	law,	the	second	sentence	states	that	both	Bolivia	and	the	Netherlands	"shall	admit"	the	investments	of	nationals	of	the	other	Contracting	Party.	This	obligation	to	
allow	 the	 entry	 of	 foreign	 investment	 is	 a	 common	 provision	 in	 bilateral	 investment	
treaties,	 and	 is	 often	 termed	 an	 "admission	 clause."	 The	 obligation	 to	 admit	 is	"subject	to"	the	decision	of	Bolivia	("its	right")	to	"exercise	powers	conferred	by	its	laws	or	regulations."		The	Tribunal	concludes	that	the	inclusion	of	the	term	"subject	to"	indicates	that	the	
duty	to	admit	investments	is	limited	by	"the	right	to	exercise	powers	conferred	by	its	laws	or	regulations."		The	Tribunal	notes	that	the	reference	specifically	subjects	the	State's	duty	to	admit	
investments	 not	 to	 the	 laws	 and	 regulations	 of	 Bolivia,	 but	 rather	 to	 the	 "right	 to	exercise	 powers"	 conferred	 by	 such	 laws	 or	 regulations.	 The	 Tribunal	 finds	 this	language	significant	as	it	implies	an	act	at	the	time	of	admittance	in	accordance	with	the	laws	or	regulations	in	force	at	that	time.78	The	paragraphs	above	support	the	interpretation	presented	here.	Firstly,	because	the	tribunal	characterises	the	admission	clause	as	an	“obligation	to	allow	the	entry”	and	a	 “duty	 to	 admit	 investments”,	 which	 restores	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 clause.	 Secondly,	because	it	emphasises	the	“right	to	exercise	powers”	as	expressed	as	a	right	to	act	or	not	at	the	time	of	admittance	in	accordance	with	the	laws	or	regulations	in	force	at	that	time.	In	a	more	nuanced	approach,	the	MTD	decision	seems	to	accept	the	principle	that	there	is	 no	 obligation	 of	 a	 State	 to	 issue	 licenses	 when	 this	 is	 against	 the	 “laws	 and	regulations”;	there	is	no	right	of	an	investor	to	a	change	of	regulation,	even	for	wrongly	admitted	investments.79		
																																																								76	Vandevelde	(n	39)	418.	77	Joubin-Bret	(n	27)	23.	78	Aguas	de	Tunari	SA	v	Republic	of	Bolivia,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/02/3,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	21	October	2005,	para	147	emphasis	added	79	MTD	Equity	Sdn	Bhd	and	MTD	Chile	SA	v	Republic	of	Chile,	 ICSID	Case	No	ARB/01/7	Award,	Merit	para	206	and	Decision	on	Annulment	Request	para	107.	MTD	also	reveal	the	principle	that	a	State	that	admits	an	 investment	contrary	to	 its	own	laws	and	regulations	 is	 in	breach	of	 the	 fair	and	equitable	treatment.	See	Award,	para	188	
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Thirdly,	 the	 decision	 in	 Aguas	de	Tunari	reinforces	 the	 interpretation	 that	 the	wrongfulness	 of	 an	 act	 of	 denial	 of	 admission	 contrary	 to	 domestic	 law	 should	 be	evaluated	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 laws	 in	 force	 at	 the	 time	 the	 investor	 attempts	 an	investment.	That	is	the	point	in	time	to	evaluate	a	violation	of	the	host	state	resulting	in	a	non-admission	decision.	This	issue	has	also	been	highlighted	in	cases	focussing	on	the	illegality	of	investments.80	So,	in	the	context	of	entry,	the	point	in	time	when	compliance	should	be	evaluated	is	generally	the	time	an	investment	is	about	to	be	made.	It	 seems	 that	one	must	not	 interpret	 “States	 shall	 admit”	as	a	 requirement	of	 a	formal	act	of	admission,	rather	than	a	right,	since	this	would	mean	that	investments	that	generally	do	not	require	express	authorization,	 licence	or	permit	would	be	outside	the	scope	of	protection.	In	the	same	way,	in	the	presence	of	expressions	such	as	“accepted”,	investments	are	covered	even	if	they	were	not	subject	to	an	“acceptance”	phase.	That	is	the	case,	for	instance,	when	they	are	made	in	a	non-prohibited	area	or	by	the	acquisition	of	shares,	thus	dispensing	with	any	positive	act	of	the	host	state.81	The	Churchill	decision	also	 recognises	 the	 principle	 that	 the	 admission	 requirement	 is	 to	 be	 analysed	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 legislation	when	 admission	 occurs	 and	where	 that	 legislation	 does	 not	require	approval,	it	should	not	be	required	afterwards.82	Acceptance	takes	place	when	an	investor	makes	an	investment	when	its	internal	law	does	not	prohibit	 it.	But	 the	discussion	 in	 the	Yukos	 exemplifies	 the	complexity	of	the	matter.	There,	it	was	explicitly	recognised	that	the	process	of	admission	may	involve	a	 continuum	 of	 stages,	 consisting	 of	 several	 consecutive	 phases	 “rather	 than	 an	instantaneous	 act”.83	To	 find	 out	 the	 exact	 moment	 of	 “admission”	 is	 a	 task	 that	 will	define	the	coverage	of	the	treaty	and	the	extent	of	the	host	state`s	obligation.	To	sum	up,	admission	clauses	in	accordance	with	laws	and	regulations	should	be	read	as	an	obligation	towards	host	states	to	avoid	caprice	or	whimsicality.	They	are	not	a	mere	 reflection	of	 customary	 international	 law,	but	 instead,	 represent	a	 fairly	 small,	but	 significant	 progress.	 They	 contain	 an	 obligation	 or	 duty	 regarding	 the	 entry	 of	investments	 for	 host	 states	 to	 avoid	 discrimination	 not	 based	 on	 their	 domestic	 legal	system.	Some	 additional	 comments	 are	 necessary.	 The	 first	 is	 why	 there	 are	 more	reported	cases	on	investors	not	complying	with	the	laws	than	on	states	not	respecting	theirs.	Denials	of	admission	and	omissions	 to	admit	 legal	 investments	are	all	 acts	 that	can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 state.84	These	 decisions	 must	 follow	 internal	 laws	 and	regulations.	Otherwise,	an	internationally	wrongful	act	will	be	committed	at	the	moment	of	 the	 refusal	 or	 omission	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law	 in	 force	 at	 the	 time	 an	attempt	to	invest	is	made.	This	interpretation	of	the	clause	was	blurred	over	the	years	by	the	discussion	of	the	protection	of	illegal	investments.	While	this	fact	may	explain	the																																																									80	Schill	(n	75)	309.	See	also	Phoenix	(n	74)	[para	103];	Fraport	AG	Frankfurt	Airport	Services	Worldwide	v	
The	Republic	of	the	Philippines,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/03/25	Award,	16	August	2007	[para	345];	World	Duty	
Free	Company	Limited	 v	 the	Republic	 of	Kenya	 ICSID	 Case	 No	 Arb/00/7	 Award,	 September	 2006	 [para	142].	81	Fraport	(n	80),	Annulment	Decision	paras	105-106.	82	Churchill	(n	58)	paras	288-292.	83	Yukos	Award	(n	74)	paras	1368-1369.		p.	434.	84	See	arts	4-11	ILC	Articles	(n	34)			
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A) The	Concept	of	Establishment	and	the	US	Model	Obligations	 regulating	 the	entry	of	 investments	have	also	been	expressed	using	the	concept	of	establishment.	This	section	starts	with	an	analysis	of	the	emergence	and	interpretation	 of	 the	 concept.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 provide	 elements	 to	 check	 whether	 its	progressive	 adoption	 is	 part	 of	 a	 trend	 towards	more	 convergence	with	 international	trade	law.	Among	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 first	 American	 BITs	 was	 the	 removal	 of	 investment	restrictions.87	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 1984	US	BIT	model	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	modern	transition	 from	 the	 language	 of	 “admit/permit”	 to	 the	 qualification	 associating	 it	 to	national	 treatment.	But	 the	 innovation	 to	grant	a	right	of	 “establishment”	 in	BITs	only	appeared	with	the	US	BITs	 in	the	second	half	of	 the	80s.	The	 language	mentioned	that	Parties	 “shall	 permit	 such	 investments	 to	 be	 established”	 and	 granted	 national	treatment.88	The	 reference	 to	 national	 treatment	 is	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 use	 of	 this	concept	 in	treaties	 is	more	connected	with	 international	trade	 law	than	the	concept	of	admission,	as	will	be	shown.	From	the	Investment	Chapter	in	the	US-Canada	Free	Trade	Agreement,89	a	 new	 type	 of	 language	 emerged,	 later	 on	 replicated	 in	 NAFTA.	 Several	other	 treaties	 started	 to	 use	 the	 concept	 of	 “establishment”	 as	 a	 substitute	 or	 as	 a	supplement	to	“admission”	or	“permission”.		Regarding	 treaties	 with	 other	 countries,	 from	 1994,	 the	 United	 States	progressively,	though	not	continuously,	started	to	change	the	language	to	the	following:	Article	II	90	1.	With	respect	 to	 the	establishment,	 acquisition,	expansion,	management,	conduct,	operation	 and	 sale	 or	 other	 disposition	 of	 covered	 investments,	 each	 Party	 shall	accord	 treatment	 no	 less	 favorable	 than	 that	 it	 accords,	 in	 like	 situations,	 to	investments	in	its	territory	of	its	own	nationals	or	companies	(hereinafter	"national	treatment")	 or	 to	 investments	 in	 its	 territory	 of	 nationals	 or	 companies	 of	 a	 third	country	(hereinafter	"most	favored	nation	treatment),	whichever	is	most	favorable	(hereinafter	"national	and	most	favored	nation	treatment").	emphasis	added	A	 related	 question	 is	whether	 the	wording	 of	 the	 US	model	 clause	 on	 national	treatment	of	establishment	covers	investments	that	do	not	require	establishment	in	the																																																									87	Patricia	 McKinstry	 Robin,	 ‘The	 Bit	 Won’t	 Bite:	 The	 American	 Bilateral	 Investment	 Treaty	 Program’	(1983)	33	American	University	Law	Review	931,	946.	88	See	eg	US	BITs	in	force	with	Senegal	[1983],	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	[1984]	and	Cameroun	[1986].	89 [1988]	 See	 art	 1602	 <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/cusfta-e.pdf>		accessed	8	June	2016	90	US-Georgia	BIT	[1994].	
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long-term,	as	argued	by	Juillard.91	Others	think	that	the	language	in	the	US	model	covers	both	admission	and	establishment	rights,92	which	raises	 the	 issue	of	how	different	 the	concepts	really	are.		The	literature	emphasises	that	there	are	points	of	distinction.93	In	general	terms,	one	view	is	that,	while	entry	rights	encompass	both	admission	and	establishment	rights,	the	admission	refers	 to	 the	ability	 to	make	an	 investment	 in	a	permitted	 form	and	the	establishment	deals	with	the	type	of	presence	permitted.94	Another	view	is	that	the	right	of	admission	is	related	to	the	right	of	entry	and	the	rules	for	admission;	in	turn,	the	right	of	 establishment	 relates	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 activity	 will	 be	 carried	 out	throughout	the	duration	of	the	investment.95	For	others,	the	right	of	admission	can	be	temporary	or	permanent	while	the	right	of	establishment	relates	to	the	permanence	of	presence,	which	is	valuable	to	long-term	investments.96	In	this	vein,	an	investor	with	a	short-term	business	might	need	no	more	than	 a	 right	 of	 admission	 compared	 to	 a	 long-term	 business	 where	 a	 right	 of	establishment	 is	necessary.97	In	 foreign	direct	 investment	–	FDI,	 the	differences	would	lose	 their	meaning	 since	 a	 long-term	 relationship	 is	 presupposed.98	In	 addition,	 there	have	been	claims	that	a	right	of	admission	works	well	in	the	case	of	portfolio	investment	in	 a	 local	 company,	 but	 both	 need	 to	 work	 together	 when	 transfer	 of	 capital	 and	productive	assets	are	necessary.99	As	 a	 proxy	 for	 ordinary	 meaning,	 legal	 dictionaries	 bring	 the	 following	definitions:	establish,	vb.	(14c)	1.	To	settle,	make,	or	fix	firmly;	to	enact	permanently.	established,	adj.	(17c)	1.	Having	existed	 for	 a	 long	period	of	 time;	 already	 in	 long-term	use	<an	established	legal	rule>[…].”	
																																																								91	Patrick	 Juillard,	 ‘Freedom	 of	 Establishment,	 Freedom	 of	 Capital	 Movements,	 and	 Freedom	 of	Investment’	(2000)	15	ICSID	Review	322,	337.	92	Martín	 Molinuevo,	 Protecting	 Investment	 in	 Services:	 Investor-State	 Arbitration	 versus	 WTO	 Dispute	
Settlement	(Kluwer	Law	International	2012)	87.	93	Ignacio	Gómez-Palacio	and	Peter	Muchlinski,	 ‘Admission	and	Establishment’	 in	Federico	Ortino,	Peter	Muchlinski	 and	Christoph	H	 Schreuer	 (eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Investment	Law	 (OUP	2008)	229.	94	Molinuevo	(n	92)	77.	95	Gómez-Palacio	and	Muchlinski	(n	93)	230.	
96	UNCTAD	 ‘Admission	 and	 Establishment’	 (New	 York	 and	 Geneva	 United	 Nations	 Publication	 2002)	UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10	(vol.	II)		12-13.	See,	generally,	United	Nations	Centre	on	Transnational	Corporations,	‘Key	 Concepts	 in	 International	 Investment	 Arrangements	 and	 their	 Relevance	 to	 Negotiations	 on	International	 Transactions	 in	 Services’	 (New	 York	 United	 Nations	 Publication	 1990)	 UNCTC	ST/CTC/SER.A/13;	 	 UNCTAD	 ‘International	 Investment	 Agreements	 in	 Services’	(New	York	 and	 Geneva	United	Nations	Publication	2005)	UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/2,	31-33	97	Dolzer	and	Schreuer	(n	27)	88.	98	Pollan	(n	40)	54.	99	Gómez-Palacio	and	Muchlinski	(n	93)	232–233.	
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establishment,	n.	 (15c)	1.	The	act	of	establishing;	 the	quality,	 state,	or	condition	of	being	established.	[…]100	While	 the	 definitions	 emphasise	 permanence	 and	 duration,	 the	 history	 of	 the	smooth	 transition	 from	 the	 admission/permission	 language	 to	 the	 establishment	language	indicates	that	it	is	hard	to	sustain	a	radical	difference,	based	on	type,	form	or	manner,	between	these	treaty	terms.	This	would	go	in	line	with	the	view	that	considers	the	 distinction	 without	 relevant	 legal	 significance;	 disregarding	 the	 duration	 of	ownership	 and	 control:	 all	 acts	 of	 investing	 should	 be	 considered	 establishment.101	Anyway,	the	extension	of	the	definition	of	investor	and	investments	is	what	will	actually	determine	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 non-discrimination	 standard	 in	 treaties,102	which	 is	 the	subject	of	the	next	section.		
B) Non-Discrimination	in	NAFTA		The	NAFTA	investment	chapter	applies	to	all	sectors,	including	services,	covering	most	favoured	nation	–	MFN	and	national	treatment	with	respect	to	the	“establishment”	of	 investments	 (art.	 1102	and	1103).	 	 The	 relevant	NAFTA	provisions	 are	 transcribed	below:	 Article	1102:	National	Treatment	1.	Each	Party	shall	accord	to	investors	of	another	Party	treatment	no	less	favorable	than	that	 it	accords,	 in	 like	circumstances,	 to	 its	own	 investors	with	respect	 to	 the	
establishment,	acquisition,	expansion,	 management,	 conduct,	 operation,	 and	 sale	 or	other	disposition	of	investments.	2.	Each	Party	shall	accord	to	investments	of	investors	of	another	Party	treatment	no	less	 favorable	than	that	 it	accords,	 in	 like	circumstances,	 to	 investments	of	 its	own	investors	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 establishment,	 acquisition,	 expansion,	 management,	conduct,	operation,	and	sale	or	other	disposition	of	investments.	Section	C	Definitions	Article	1139:	Definitions	…	investor	 of	 a	 Party	means	 a	 Party	 or	 state	 enterprise	 thereof,	 or	 a	 national	 or	 an	enterprise	of	 such	Party,	 that	seeks	to	make,	 is	making	or	has	made	an	 investment.	[emphasis	added]	




Moreover,	NAFTA	Chapter	12	covers	service	supply	including	“the	presence	in	its	territory	 of	 a	 service	 provider	 of	 another	 Party”.103	NAFTA	 articles	 1202	 and	 1203,	respectively	national	 treatment	and	MFN	 for	 services,	only	apply	 to	 service	providers,	arguably	affecting	mainly	foreign	investors	in	services.104	The	language	is	the	following:		Article	1202:	National	Treatment	1.	 Each	 Party	 shall	 accord	 to	 service	providers	 of	 another	 Party	 treatment	 no	 less	favorable	than	that	it	accords,	in	like	circumstances,	to	its	own	service	providers.	
…	Article	1213:	Definitions	service	 provider	 of	 a	 Party	 means	 a	 person	 of	 a	 Party	 that	 seeks	 to	 provide	 or	provides	a	service;	[emphasis	added]	The	presence	of	 the	expressions	 “establishment,	 acquisition,	 expansion”,	 “seeks	to	 make”	 and	 “seeks	 to	 provide”	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 giving	 rise	 to	 international	obligations	 to	 grant	 access	 to	 investments	 and	 investors.	 These	 expressions	 are	 also	connected	with	 the	 interpretation	 of	 some	 provisions	 in	 the	 GATS,	 as	 will	 be	 shown.	NAFTA	 included	 non-conforming	 measures	 (art.	 1101.2,	 Annex	 I	 and	 II),	 in	 which	countries	could	 list	all	 the	areas	where	no	obligations	were	undertaken,	e.g.	 restricted	investment	areas.	The	 application	of	 the	 concepts	 in	 those	provisions	 requires	 the	definition	of	 a	standard	 of	 comparison	 of	 non-discrimination.	 This	 has	 been	 developed	 through	 the	case	 law	 related	 to	 the	 treatment	 of	 protected	 investments.	 But	 while	 “national	treatment”	 and	 “like	 circumstances”	 deserved	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 from	 case	 law	 and	academic	 literature,105	“establishment”	did	not	have	the	same	fate.	Some	interpret	that	the	 lack	 of	 disputes	 shows	 that	 the	 liberalising	 effect	 of	 national	 treatment	 with	reference	to	establishment	was	accepted	without	resistance.106		However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 NAFTA	 cases	 focused	 on	 trade	 in	services	 (S.D.	 Myers107)	 or	 trade	 in	 goods	 (Pope	 &	 Talbot,108	Canada	 Cattlemen,109	
Softwood	Lumber110)	have	been	brought	as	 investment	disputes.111	These	NAFTA	cases																																																									103	art	1201.1	(d)	104	ibid.	105	Nicholas	DiMascio	and	Joost	Pauwelyn,	‘Nondiscrimination	in	Trade	and	Investment	Treaties:	Worlds	Apart	or	Two	Sides	of	the	Same	Coin’	(2008)	102	AJIL	48,	71–79.	106	Pollan	(n	40)	98–99.	107	S.D.	Myers,	Inc.	v	Government	of	Canada,	UNCITRAL,	First	Partial	Award	on	Merit	and	Separate	Opinion,	13	November	2000.	108	Pope	&	Talbot	Inc.	v	The	Government	of	Canada,	UNCITRAL,	Award	on	Merits,	10	April	2001.	109	Canadian	Cattlemen	For	Fair	Trade	et	al	v	US, UNCITRAL	Arbitral	 Award	On	 Jurisdiction,	 28	 January	2008.		110	Re	NAFTA	and	a	Request	 for	Consolidation	by	 the	USA	of	 the	Claims	 in	Canfor	Corporation	 v	USA	and	
Tembec	et	al.	v	USA	and	Terminal	Forest	Products	Ltd.	v	USA,	 7	 September	 2005,	 Order	 of	 Consolidation.	For	 a	 comment,	 see	 Joost	 Pauwelyn,	 ‘Editorial	 Comment:	 Adding	 Sweeteners	 to	 Softwood	 Lumber:	The	WTO–NAFTA	“Spaghetti	Bowl”	Is	Cooking’	(2006)	9	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	197.	
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are	 arguably	 mixed	 trade/investment	 cases	 related	 to	 discriminatory	 denial	 of	opportunities	for	market	access.112	As	an	example,	the	S.D.	Myers	award	decided	that	an	export	 ban	 interfered	with	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 investor,	which	 provided	 services	 of	processing	and	disposal	of	hazardous	waste.	The	discriminatory	measure	breached	the	national	treatment	obligation	and	resulted	in	compensation	for	lost	 income,	derived	of	losses	of	market	opportunities.113	The	 case	 involving	 Mexican	 investments	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Mexico	v	United	
States)114	was	a	rare	example	of	a	case	directly	dealing	with	establishment.	It	ruled	that:	A	blanket	refusal	to	permit	a	person	of	Mexico	to	establish	an	enterprise	in	the	United	
States	 to	 provide	 truck	 services	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 international	 cargo	between	points	 in	 the	United	 States	 is,	on	its	face,	less	favorable	than	the	treatment	accorded	 to	 U.S.	 truck	 service	 providers	 in	 like	 circumstances,	 and	 is	 contrary	 to	Article	1102.		The	US	measure	at	issue	was	a	general	one,	restricting	de	jure	the	establishment	of	 foreign	 investors	 in	 services.	 Individual	 companies	 that	 sought	 to	 invest	were	 also	affected.	 But,	 what	 matters	 is	 that,	 in	 this	 NAFTA	 case,	 the	 non-admission	 of	 an	investment	 affected	 the	 provision	 of	 international	 services	 and	 this	 is	 evidence	 of	 the	relation	between	concepts	of	investment	law	and	trade	in	services.		
C) The	Return	of	Establishment	Rights		 It	 is	 to	 be	 highlighted	 that	 entry	 commitments	 are	 closely	 linked	 to	 domestic	regulatory	policy.115	A	stronger	liberalisation	effect	is	reached	when	national	treatment	is	applied	to	the	conditions	to	make	an	investment,	regulating	competitive	opportunities	for	 access.	 But	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	 politically	 more	 difficult	 to	 grant	 access	 to	 a	 large	number	of	 investments	 than	 to	protect	 them.116	A	way	 to	 recognise	 the	 great	 political	challenges	 involved	 in	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 barriers	 is	 the	 introduction	 of	 flexibilities.	They	 allow	 for	 some	 policy	 space	 for	 legitimate	 regulation	 but	 also	 some	 breathing	
																																																																																																																																																																													111	Rodney	Neufeld,	‘Trade	and	Investment’	in	Daniel	Bethlehem	and	others	(eds),	The	Oxford	handbook	of	
international	trade	law	(OUP	2009)	642.	112	Gómez-Palacio	and	Muchlinski	(n	93)	232.	113	S.D.	Myers,	Inc.	v.	Government	of	Canada,	UNCITRAL,	Second	Partial	Award	on	Merit,	21	October	2002	para	100	114	Re	 Cross-Border	Trucking	 Services	 (Mexico	 v	US),	 Case	 No	 USA-MEX-98-2008-01,	 NAFTA	 ch	 20	 Arb	Trib.	 Panel	 Decision,	 Final	 Report,	 2,	 (6	 February	 2001),	 para	 292	 	 <https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DesktopModules/NAFTA_DecisionReport/pdf.ashx?docID=18355&lang=1>	 accessed	 8	 June	2016,	emphasis	added.	For	a	recent	analysis	of	the	decision	see	Puig,	‘The	Merging	of	International	Trade	and	Investment	Law’	(n	8)	19–23.	115	UNCTAD,	 ‘World	 Investment	 Report’	 (United	Nations	 2015)	UNCTAD/WIR/2015	 163;	 For	 the	most	recent	statistics,	see	UNCTAD,	‘World	Investment	Report’	(United	Nations	2016)	UNCTAD/WIR/2016.	116	Pollan	(n	40)	42.	
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space	 to	 garner	 political	 support.117	The	 requirement	 to	 negotiate	 reservations	 to	specific	investments	or	measures	is	generally	costly	to	countries.118	To	illustrate,	the	right	of	establishment	was	also	discussed	in	the	Organization	for	Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 draft	 Multilateral	 Agreement	 on	Investments	 (MAI).	 In	 a	 traditional	 north-south	 BIT,	 when	 investment	 flows	 are	 one-directional	between	a	net	capital	 importing	country	and	net	capital	exporting	country,	the	latter	can	be	more	selective	in	crafting	the	agreement	and	less	reluctant	in	granting	these	establishment	rights	since	 few	will	benefit	 in	exchange	of	 the	protection	of	 their	nationals	 in	 the	 host	 country.119	For	 some	 developed	 countries,	 the	 introduction	 of	establishment	rights	in	MAI	would	mean	the	opening	of	sensitive	sectors	for	other	large	developed	 countries;	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 was	 probably	 not	 in	 their	 interest,	 the	negotiations	stalled.120	In	 this	 regard,	 while	 ten	 years	 ago	 commentators	 claimed	 that	 the	 liberalising	effects	 of	 BITs	 were	 small,121	now	 the	 trend	 has	 started	 to	 reverse.122	There	 is	 a	recognition	of	the	rising	number	of	ITs	providing	for	establishment	rights,	representing	an	increasing	percentage	of	the	total	number	of	BITs	(228	by	the	end	of	2014,	as	shown	in	the	table	below):		
Table	1	–	International	Investment	Agreements	with	Entry	Rights123	
	Source:	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	2015	














A) Commercial	Presence		 The	GATS	has	been	described	as	a	tool	to	open	markets	and	as	complementary	to	BITs.133	As	already	indicated,	the	GATS	concept	of	“commercial	presence”	is	the	starting	point	 to	 understand	 the	 application	 of	 international	 trade	 law	 to	 the	 entry	 of	investments.	 In	general	 terms,	 it	 represents	 the	“connecting	 factor”	between	 the	GATS	and	investments.134	Before	turning	to	it,	one	might	benefit	from	analysing	its	emergence	as	a	concept.	The	most	 pressing	 questions	 during	 the	Uruguay	Round	 as	 to	 the	 definition	 of	services	were	whether	and	how	trade	in	services	should	be	distinguished	from	foreign	investment	in	services	and	whether	it	should	include	the	movement	of	labour.135	While	the	coverage	of	the	former	topic	interested	the	developed	countries,	the	latter	issue	was	of	interest	to	the	developing	world.136	Despite	the	recognition	that	some	sort	of	right	of	establishment	was	essential	to	ensure	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 service	 sectors,	 WTO	 members	 wanted	 to	 avoid	 the	impression	 that	 it	 was	 unqualified	 and	 absolute;	 the	 term	 was	 avoided,	 given	 the	particular	 connotation	 to	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 opposition	 of	 developing	countries.137	The	solution	described	a	specific	mode	for	the	delivery	of	services	-	Mode	3,	defined	 in	 the	 GATS.138	In	 that	 sense,	Mode	 3	 (and	 also	Mode	 4139)	 commitments	 are	seen	as	a	way	to	liberalise	FDI.140	
																																																								133	Bart	 De	 Meester	 and	 Dominic	 Coppens,	 ‘Mode	 3	 of	 the	 GATS:	 A	 Model	 for	 Disciplining	 Measures	Affecting	 Investment	Flows?’,	Regulation	of	Foreign	Investment,	 vol	21	(World	Scientific	2013)	111;	146;	Vandevelde	(n	67)	502.	134	Meester	and	Coppens	(n	133)	99;	Vandevelde	 (n	67)	497;	Martıń	Molinuevo,	 ‘Foreign	 Investment	 in	Services	and	the	DSU’	in	Marion	Panizzon,	Nicole	Pohl	and	Pierre	Sauvé	(eds),	GATS	and	the	Regulation	of	
International	Trade	in	Services	(CUP	2008)	319.	135	Andrew	 Lang,	World	 Trade	 Law	 after	 Neoliberalism:	 Re-Imagining	 the	 Global	 Economic	 Order	 (OUP	2011)	277.	136	ibid	279.	137	Ansgar	 M	 Wimmer,	 ‘The	 Impact	 of	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 on	 the	 OECD	Multilateral	Agreement	on	Investment’	(1995)	19	World	Competition	109,	113.	138	art	 I.2(c):	 …	 the	 supply	 of	 a	 service	 “by	 a	 service	 supplier	 of	 one	 Member,	 through	 commercial	presence	in	the	territory	of	any	other	member.”	
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This	context	gave	rise	to	the	formula	of	commercial	presence	in	GATS	art.	XXVIII	(d):		 “commercial	 presence”	means	 any	 type	 of	 business	 or	 professional	 establishment,	including	 through	 (i)	 the	 constitution,	 acquisition	 or	 maintenance	 of	 a	 juridical	person,	 or	 (ii)	 the	 creation	 or	maintenance	 of	 a	 branch	 or	 a	 representative	 office,	within	 the	 territory	 of	 a	Member	 for	the	purpose	of	 supplying	a	service;	 [emphasis	added]	The	 concept	 of	 “commercial	 presence”	 includes	 not	 only	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	juridical	person	but	also	the	acquisition	of	an	existing	one.141	The	definition	of	“juridical	person”142	is	complementary	in	this	regard.	It	is	noted	that:	[t]he	 ‘constitution	 of	 a	 juridical	 person’	 under	 the	 GATS	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	administrative	procedures	of	registering	a	juridical	person.	Indeed,	the	GATS	defines	‘juridical	person’	in	broad	terms,	de	facto	equating	it	with	the	more	general	concept	of	‘company’	or	even	‘investment’.	…	As	such,	there	seems	to	be	no	difference	between	
the	GATS	concept	of	‘constitution	of	a	juridical	person’,	complemented	by	the	reference	
to	the	 ‘creation	of	a	branch	or	representative	office’,	and	the	BIT’s	and	PTA’s	general	
notion	of	the	investment’s	‘establishment’.143		Nevertheless,	 one	may	 underline	 the	 narrow	meaning	 of	 commercial	 presence	compared	 to	 the	 asset-based	 definition	 of	 investment	 and	 the	 approximation	 of	 the	concept	of	commercial	presence	to	FDI:	despite	the	lack	of	uniformity	in	the	definition	of	the	latter,	all	the	elements	of	the	definition	of	the	former	cover	traditional	aspects	of	FDI	in	 services.144	It	 is	 not	 clear,	 though,	 whether	 the	 term	 includes	 other	 categories,	 but	certainly	not	bonds	and	portfolio	investments.145	Early	 analysis	 of	 the	GATS	 already	 argued	 that	 economic	 activities	 prior	 to	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 business	 in	 services	 may	 be	 covered	 by	 the	 commercial	 presence	definition.146	The	 reference	 to	 the	 constitution	 of	 a	 juridical	 person	 includes	 all	 the	procedures	 related	 to	 the	 setting-up	 of	 the	 company	 engaged	 in	 services	 in	 the	 host	country.147	The	presence	of	the	words	“constitution”,	“acquisition”	and	“creation”	in	the	
																																																																																																																																																																													139	It	 is	 to	 be	 emphasised	 that	 mode	 4	 commitment	 on	 temporary	 presence	 of	 physical	 persons	 are	essential	complements	for	the	establishment	and	operation	of	commercial	presence,	since	they	deal	with	key	 personal	 and	 management	 and	 intra-corporate	 transferees;	 therefore,	 they	 should	 be	 deemed	relevant.	 In	 Pierre	 Sauvé,	 Trade	Rules	behind	Borders:	Essays	on	Services,	 Investment	and	the	New	Trade	





have	not	yet	made	an	investment.	As	underlined	in	the	previous	sections,	the	expressions	“seeks	 to	 make”	 and	 “seeks	 to	 provide”	 in	 the	 NAFTA	 and	 in	 other	 BITs	 can	 be	interpreted	as	giving	rise	 to	 international	obligations	 to	grant	access	 to	 investors.	The	same	 occurs	 in	 relation	 to	 commercial	 presence.	 In	 its	 own	 right,	 the	 Appellate	 Body	already	recognised	that	WTO	law	is	clearly	concerned	with	the	position	of	investors.150	In	this	vein,	one	can	say	that	measures	that	prevent	the	possibility	of	commercial	presence	are	covered.151	This	includes	situations	involving	investors	which	are	not	yet	a	service	 supplier	 and	 seek	 to	 become	 one	 by	 acquisition,	 since	 they	 will	 be	 service	suppliers	at	the	moment	of	the	investment.152	It	is	important	to	recall	that	the	existence	of	trade	flows	is	not	required	for	the	GATS	to	apply.	This	is	because	the	flows	may	have	been	 prevented,	 though	 this	 has	 to	 be	 based	 on	 an	 examination	 of	 relevant	 facts.153	Another	 argument	 to	 support	 this	 conclusion	 is	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 expression	 “for	 the	purpose	of	supplying	a	service”.154	Feinaugle	acutely	notes	that	the	reason	is	that	“in	the	case	of	commercial	presence,	establishment	in	the	territory	of	a	Member	must	take	place	first	 before	 the	 services	 supply	 can	 start”;	 so,	 in	 this	 phase,	 there	 is	 “only	 the	 plan	 to	
supply	the	service,	and	the	future	service	supplier	bears	the	burden	of	proof	for	this…”155	This	approach	bears	a	similarity	with	the	definitions	of	investor	and	service	providers	in	several	 ITs.	 The	 last	 section	 will	 elaborate	 more	 on	 this	 issue,	 emphasising	 the	connections	of	the	likeness	test	of	services	suppliers	with	the	concept	of	investors.	What	 matters	 most	 to	 this	 discussion	 are	 the	 commonalities	 between	 both	regimes.	 There	 is	 some	 conceptual	 identification	 between	 commercial	 presence	 and	establishment.	 It	 is	 also	 recognised	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 provisions	 in	 both	regimes	cope	with	the	situation	of	investors	that	seek	to	invest,	that	is,	covering	the	very	process	of	making	an	investment.		
																																																								148	ibid	79.	149	WTO,	 China:	Measures	Affecting	Trading	Rights	and	Distribution	Services	 for	Certain	Publications	and	
Audiovisual	 Entertainment	 Products	 –	 Report	 of	 the	 Panel,	 (12	 August	 2009)	 WT/DS363/R,	 para	 7974	<http://docsonline.wto.org>	accessed	8	June	2016	150	WTO,	China:	Publications	and	Audiovisual	Products	–	Report	of	the	Appellate	Body	 (19	January	2010)	WT/DS363/AB/R	 para	 227	 “…Thus,	 for	 example,	 restrictions	 imposed	 on	 investors,	 wholesalers,	 and	manufacturers,	 as	well	 as	on	points	of	 sale	and	ports	of	 entry,	have	been	 found	 to	be	 inconsistent	with	Article	III:4	or	Article	XI:1	of	the	GATT	1947	or	1994.”	See	also	Eeckhout	(n	4)	4.	151	Meester	and	Coppens	(n	133)	102.	152	ibid	106.	153	Eric	 H	 Leroux,	 ‘From	 Periodicals	 to	 Gambling:	 A	 Review	 of	 Systemic	 Issues	 Addressed	 by	 WTO	Adjudicatory	Bodies	under	GATS’	 in	Marion	Panizzon,	Nicole	Pohl	and	Pierre	Sauvé	 (eds),	GATS	and	the	
Regulation	of	International	Trade	in	Services	(CUP	2008)	271–272.	154	See	the	expression	in	the	context	of	the	definition	of	GATS	art.	XXVIII	(d),	transcribed	above.	155	Clemens	 Feinäugle,	 ‘Article	 XXVIII’	 in	 Rüdiger	 Wolfrum,	 Peter-Tobias	 Stoll	 and	 Clemens	 Feinäugle	(eds),	WTO--trade	in	services	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2008)	549	emphasis	added.	
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B) Reevaluating	Market	Access	for	Investments	in	Services		 While	 there	seems	 to	be	no	major	difference	between	 liberalisation	 investment	agreements	and	the	GATS,	they	may	vary	in	the	general	scope	and	clause	drafting.156	An	investment	 measure	 is	 only	 covered	 by	 specific	 GATS	 obligations	 if	 a	 Member	 has	scheduled	mode	3	commitments	to	 liberalise	the	service	sectors	to	which	the	measure	applies.	This	is	the	case	of	the	obligations	on	“domestic	regulation”	(art.	VI)	157	and	also	of	 those	 obligations	 subject	 to	 qualifications:	 “market	 access”	 (art.	 XVI)	 and	 “national	treatment”	(art.	XVII).158	Having	presented	the	aspects	related	to	commercial	presence	and	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 entry	 of	 investments,	 the	 following	 sections	 deal	 with	 the	interpretation	 of	 the	 provisions	 on	market	 access	 and	 on	 national	 treatment,	when	 it	comes	to	the	regulation	of	the	investments.	These	 provisions	 have	 constitutional-type	 features	 and	 functions:	 they	 employ	general	indeterminate	concepts	containing	the	fundamental	principles	of	the	system	of	regulatory	schemes	affecting	trade	in	services.159	In	this	regard,	adjudication	under	the	GATS	 has	 generated	 cases,	 though	 not	 numerous,	 containing	 technical,	 but	 important	elements	for	its	interpretation.	The	following	sections	also	provide	some	background	for	the	 analysis	 of	 recent	 GATS	 cases	 affecting	 the	 entry	 of	 foreign	 investors	 (China-
Publications	 and	 Audiovisual	 Products, 160 	China-Electronic	 Payment	 Services 161 	and	
Argentina-Financial	Services162).	At	 first	 sight,	 an	 article	 named	 “market	 access”	 such	 as	 GATS	 art.	 XVI,	 when	related	to	commitments	in	mode	3,	seems	to	constitute	the	main	provision	dealing	with	the	entry	 of	 foreign	 investments	 in	 services.	But	market	access	 is,	 in	essence,	a	 legally	defined	 concept,	 containing	 a	 list	 of	 six	 kinds	 of	 prohibited	 measures	 to	 scheduled	services:	 	
Market	Access		1.	 With	 respect	 to	market	access	through	the	modes	of	supply	identified	in	Article	I,	each	 Member	 shall	 accord	 services	 and	 service	 suppliers	 of	 any	 other	 Member	treatment	no	less	favourable	than	that	provided	for	under	the	terms,	limitations	and	




a	Member	shall	not	maintain	or	adopt	either	on	the	basis	of	a	regional	subdivision	or	on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 entire	 territory,	 unless	 otherwise	 specified	 in	 its	 Schedule,	 are	defined	as:		…		(e)	measures	 which	 restrict	 or	 require	 specific	 types	 of	 legal	 entity	 or	 joint	 venture	through	which	a	service	supplier	may	supply	a	service;		and		(f)	 limitations	 on	 the	 participation	 of	 foreign	 capital	 in	 terms	 of	 maximum	percentage	limit	on	foreign	shareholding	or	the	total	value	of	individual	or	aggregate	
foreign	investment.	[fns	omitted,	emphasis	added]		Full	market	access	under	the	GATS	just	means	that	none	of	the	six	measures	are	present,	 but	 it	 is	 far	 from	 openness	 to	 investments.163	Anyway,	 the	 principle	 of	progressive	 liberalisation	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 GATS.164	And	 the	market	access	provision	touches	upon	one	of	the	main	pillars	in	the	process	of	the	liberalisation	of	services:	the	removal	of	barriers	that	apply	to	both	domestic	and	foreign	providers.165	In	this	context,	the	obligation	applies	also	to	non-discriminatory	measures	that	concern	or	limit	both	domestic	and	foreigners	(as	well	discriminatory	ones)	provided	that	they	




branch	or	a	representative	office,	means	more	control	and	regulation	by	the	host	State.	Rather	 than	 an	 investment	 restriction,	 a	 measure	 like	 that	 would	 be	 an	 obligation	to	
invest	in	order	to	supply	a	service,	which	is	prohibited	in	a	scheduled	sector.	It	is	also	essential	to	note	that	art.	XVI.2	(f)	contains	one	of	the	few	references	to	the	expression	“investment”	(and	not	“commercial	presence”	or	“services	suppliers”)171	in	 the	 whole	 set	 of	 WTO	 agreements.172	According	 to	 Molinuevo	 and	 Delimatsis,	 this	might	suggest	a	broad	coverage	of	the	expression.173	This	is	because	it	would	encompass	all	measures	that	 limit	 the	total	value	of	 investments	 in	 the	capital	of	companies.	That	would	 include	measures	 limiting	 foreign	 equity	 even	 if	 it	 does	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 50%,	which	would	configure	control,	and,	thus,	commercial	presence.	So,	this	reference	might	regulate	any	other	levels	of	participation	of	foreign	investment.		Others,	however,	sustain	a	narrower	interpretation.	If	no	control	is	acquired,	the	measure	would	not	affect	trade	in	services	in	mode	3	at	all.174	This	means	that	the	GATS,	as	a	whole,	would	not	be	applicable.	In	that	regard,	China	–	Publications	and	Audiovisuals	
Products	seems	to	reveal	that	only	if	a	clear	quantitative	limitation	is	used	would	there	be	a	breach	of	the	article.175	There	is	another	sign	that	there	is	more	investment	regulation	in	the	WTO	than	commonly	recognised.	It	is	the	obligation	to	allow	the	movement	and	transfers	of	capital	essential	to	commitments	made	in	mode	3	(and	also	in	mode	1).176	This	is	expressed	in	the	second	part	of	footnote	8	of	GATS	art.	XVI:1:	8	…		If	a	Member	undertakes	a	market-access	commitment	in	relation	to	the	supply	of	
a	service	through	the	mode	of	supply	referred	to	in	subparagraph	2(c)	of	Article	I,	 it	 is	thereby	 committed	 to	allow	related	transfers	of	capital	 into	 its	 territory.	 [emphasis	added]	It	 contains	 a	 loose	 requirement	 of	 capital	 transfers	 “related”	 to	 the	 service	 (or	investment).	 This	 is	 justified	 since	 “a	 commercial	 presence	will	 often	 entail	 incidental	capital	transfers	(for	instance,	for	the	establishment	of	the	presence	or	the	repatriation	of	gains)	even	if	the	service	to	be	provided	does	not	itself	involve	a	capital	transfer.”177	In	any	case,	 it	 is	convincing	to	believe	that	the	provision	is	only	 limited	to	 inward	capital	flows,	given	 the	expression	 “capital	 into	 its	 territory”;	 so	 that	 repatriation	of	 capital	 is	not	encompassed	in	the	provision.178	To	 sum	 up,	 the	 most	 striking	 aspect	 of	 the	 market	 access	 provision	 is	 that	 it	potentially	applies	to	the	entry	of	investments	in	services,	even	if	the	measures	are	not																																																									171	Molinuevo	and	Delimatsis	(n	163)	389.	172	The	others	are:	Definition	 in	the	Annex	on	Financial	Services,	art	5(a)(xiii)	and	(xvi),	which	mention	investments	in	“collective	investment	management”	and	“investment	and	portfolio	research	and	advice”.	173	Molinuevo	and	Delimatsis	(n	163)	390.	174	Meester	and	Coppens	(n	133)	106.	175	China	–	Publications	and	Audiovisual	Products	(n	149)	paras	7,1392-7,1394	176	Steger	(n	10)	160.	177	Benedict	Christ	and	Marion	Panizzon,	‘Article	XI’	in	Rüdiger	Wolfrum,	Peter-Tobias	Stoll	and	Clemens	Feinäugle	(eds),	WTO--trade	in	services	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2008)	250	emphasis	added.	178	Molinuevo	and	Delimatsis	(n	163)	373.	
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discriminatory.	This	is	in	contrast	even	with	the	classical	content	of	liberalisation	BITs.	But	the	provision	is	progressively	being	incorporated	in	an	investment	context,	and	this	will	be	explored	in	the	analysis	of	CETA.	Finally,	depending	on	how	adjudication	in	the	GATS	develops,	 the	scope	of	 the	provision	on	market	access	might	be	 larger	 than	ever	thought	 in	 relation	 to	 investments,	 so	 the	 potential	 connections	 will	 become	 more	evident.		
C) National	Treatment	and	Non-Discrimination	on	Entry:	Potential	Investors?	This	section	deals	with	another	constitutional	concept	in	the	GATS:	the	provision	on	 national	 treatment.	 It	 highlights	 some	 important	 aspects,	 especially	 related	 to	 the	entry	of	investments	and	investors,	in	order	to	provide	context	for	the	upcoming	papers.	The	 comparison	with	 BITs	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 important	 since	 it	 paves	 the	way	 for	 the	question	of	whether	substantive	convergence	is	a	positive	development.	Direct	 language	 conferring	 entry	 rights	 is	 arguably	 unnecessary	when	 national	treatment	is	granted	in	relation	to	entry.179	That	is	the	technique	used	in	GATS	art.	XVII:		
National	Treatment		1.	 In	 the	 sectors	 inscribed	 in	 its	 Schedule,	 and	 subject	 to	 any	 conditions	 and	qualifications	 set	 out	 therein,	 each	 Member	 shall	 accord	 to	 services	 and	 service	suppliers	 of	 any	 other	 Member,	 in	 respect	 of	 all	 measures	 affecting	 the	 supply	of	
services,	treatment	no	less	favourable	than	that	it	accords	to	its	own	like	services	and	
service	suppliers.		2.	 A	Member	may	meet	 the	 requirement	 of	 paragraph	 1	 by	 according	 to	 services	and	 service	 suppliers	 of	 any	 other	Member,	 either	 formally	 identical	 treatment	 or	formally	different	 treatment	 to	 that	 it	 accords	 to	 its	 own	 like	 services	 and	 service	suppliers.		3.	 Formally	identical	or	formally	different	treatment	shall	be	considered	to	be	less	favourable	 if	 it	modifies	the	conditions	of	competition	in	favour	of	services	or	service	




them	matters	in	the	analysis	of	likeness.181	Here,	it	is	better	to	save	the	reader	from	the	extensive	discussion	in	academic	 literature	on	how	to	best	address	the	 likeness	test	of	services	and	service	suppliers.182	All	in	all,	it	seems	there	are	arguments	to	support	that	likeness	should	be	analysed	separately	 for	services	and	service	suppliers,	but	 it	 is	also	true	that	there	may	be	valid	reasons	to	treat	differently	similar	suppliers	of	like	services	(e.g.	a	bank	and	an	insurance	company).183	The	 definition	 of	 likeness	 of	 service	 suppliers	 had	 been	 interpreted	 in	 cases	exclusively	as	suppliers	that	provide	 like	services.184	China	–	Publications	and	Audiovisual	
Products	 apparently	 started	 to	 attribute	 to	 the	 service	 supplier	 a	 special	 analysis,	185	which	 is	 a	 small	 but	 welcome	 development.	 The	 Panel	 had	 found	 that	 some	 of	 the	Chinese	 measures	 related	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 reading	 materials	 and	 audio-visual	products,	 including	 foreign-invested	entities,	were	 in	breach	of	 the	market	 access	 and	national	 treatment	 provisions.186	But	 since	 discrimination	 de	jure	 was	 found,	 no	 deep	analysis	of	likeness	was	necessary.		The	 second	 aspect,	 connected	 to	 the	 first,	 is	 the	 treatment	 of	 potential	 service	
suppliers,	 in	this	context,	potential	investors.	As	seen	in	relation	to	the	broad	extension	of	“commercial	presence”,	the	GATS	covers	the	situation	when	an	investor	is	seeking	to	make	 an	 investment	 in	 services.	 Companies	 with	 the	 capability	 and	 opportunity	 to	provide	 services	 (investors)	 have	 been	 considered	 potential	 service	 suppliers,	 and	therefore	also	the	object	of	article	XVII	in	an	analysis	of	competition	conditions.187	They	benefit	 from	 national	 treatment,	 conferred	 to	 national	 like	 service	 suppliers,	 thus,	national	 investors.188	This	 proposition	 is	 not	 exempt	 from	 criticism.189	Anyhow,	 Zdouc	warns	that:	[t]he	 possible	 exclusion	 of	many	 potential	service	suppliers	 from	 the	 enjoyment	 of	GATS	 rights	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	 exceedingly	 narrow	 ‘likeness’	 definition	 of	 service	suppliers	could	undermine	the	liberalizing	effect	of	the	GATS	which	derives	from	the	creation	of	market	access	opportunities	for	foreign	service	suppliers.190	
																																																								181	Diebold	(n	104)	177;	186–187.	182	Werner	 Zdouc,	 ‘WTO	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Practice	 Relating	 to	 the	 GATS’	 (1999)	 2	 Journal	 of	International	Economic	Law	295,	333;	Diebold	(n	104)	198–203;	209–215;	Markus	Krajewski	and	Maika	Engelke,	‘Article	XVII’	in	Rüdiger	Wolfrum,	Peter-Tobias	Stoll	and	Clemens	Feinäugle	(eds),	WTO-Trade	in	
Services	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2008)	407–409.	183	Diebold	(n	104)	199.	184	WTO,	European	Communities:	Regime	for	the	Importation,	Sale	and	Distribution	of	Bananas	–	Report		of	
the	 Panel	 (25	 September	 1997)	 WT/DS27/R/USA	 para	 7322	 [WT/DS27/AB/R	 for	 the	 Report	 of	 the	Appellate	 Body];	WTO,	Canada:	Certain	Measures	Affecting	the	Automotive	Industry	 –	Report	of	the	Panel	(19	June	 2000)	 WT/DS139/R,	 WT/DS142/R]	 para	 10.248	 [Report	 of	 the	 Appellate	 Body	WT/DS139/AB/R,	WT/DS142/AB/R]	185	Diebold	(n	104)	195.	186	China	–	Publications	and	Audiovisual	Products	AB/R	(n	150)	para	413.	187	EC-Bananas	Panel	Report	(n	184),	para	7.320	Krajewski	and	Engelke	(n	182)	406–407.	188	Diebold	(n	104)	185.	189	Canada	Autos	AB	Report	(n	184)	para	164;	Feinäugle	(n	155)	553–554.	190	Zdouc	(n	182)	333.	
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It	has	also	been	noted	that	there	are	blurred	lines	to	differentiate	measures	that	affect	the	right	to	enter	a	country	and	that	affect	the	supply	of	the	service.191	Eeckhout	highlights	that	when	it	comes	to	services,	“the	distinction	between	border	measures	and	internal	 regulation	 is	 not	 on	 the	whole	 a	 useful	 classification,	 due	 to	 the	 non-physical	character	of	service	transactions.	International	trade	in	services	is	affected	and	hindered	
by	all	kinds	of	regulatory	activity…”.192	Diebold	brings	the	following	clarification	as	to	the	two	different	moments	where	a	measure	could	apply:	(i)	at	the	stage	the	supplier	enters	the	importing	country	or	establishes	himself	on	the	territory	 of	 the	 importing	 country;	 or	 (ii)	 at	 the	 stage	 of	 service	 supply.	In	 simple	terms,	 the	 former	 are	 aimed	 at	 preventing	the	supplier	from	entering	or	staying	on	
the	territory	and	the	latter	try	to	prevent	the	supplier	from	providing	the	service	on	the	 territory	 of	 the	 importing	 country.	 …	 Concerning	 the	mode	 of	 supply	 through	
commercial	presence	(mode	3),	a	measure	on	entering	and	establishing	could	take	the	form	 of	 more	 burdensome	 capital	 requirements,	 limitation	 of	 foreign	 capital,	allowing	only	specific	 legal	entities	or	 joint	ventures	or	an	outright	prohibition	 for	foreign	suppliers	to	set	up	an	office,	or	any	other	legal	entity.	At	the	stage	of	supply,	the	restriction	could	occur,	 for	example,	 in	the	refusal	of	a	licence	that	is	required	to	
provide	the	service	or	by	imposing	unfavourable	or	additional	supply	conditions.193		At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 shows	 the	 artificial	 divide	 between	 discrimination	 or	market	access	at	the	border	and	discrimination	in	domestic	regulation.	In	several	cases,	the	 measure	 at	 issue	 will	 apply	 both	 to	 the	 entry	 and	 to	 the	 actual	 supply.	 Think	 of	licences	that	require	specific	capital	or	financial	requirements.	It	arguably	makes	sense	to	 grant	 national	 treatment	 to	 potential	service	 suppliers	 that	 could	 be	 providing	 the	services,	were	it	not	for	the	measure.	Having	established	likeness,	the	analysis	moves	to	the	less	favourable	treatment.	Since	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 investors,	 therefore,	 on	 mode	 3,	 it	 is	 of	 interest	 whether	 this	involves	an	impact	test	including	other	modes	of	supply.	The	challenge	would	be	how	to	properly	 establish	 a	 group	 comparator.	 Services	 regulation	 generally	 applies	 to	 the	supplier	 and	 supplier-based	 discrimination	 is	 more	 effective	 in	 relation	 to	 services	supplied	 in	 modes	 3	 and	 4,194	in	 contrast	 to	 modes	 1	 and	 2.	 	 So,	 in	 the	 case	 of	investments,	 the	 comparison	 is	 easier	 to	 establish:	 foreign	 mode	 3	 suppliers	 have	generally	a	counterpart,	which	is	a	like	domestic	company	or	natural	person.195	But	a	mode-fragmented	approach	to	the	national	treatment	obligation	may	lead	to	 unwanted	 results.	196	That	 is	 why	 some	 advocate	 for	 the	 criteria	 of	 competitive	relationship	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 group	 of	 comparators.	 Diebold	 suggests	 that	“national	 treatment	 must	 be	 interpreted	 such	 that	 it	 protects	 the	 competitive	opportunities	of	all	foreign	services	and	suppliers	–	regardless	of	the	respective	mode	or	method	 of	 supply	 …”197.	 This	 goes	 in	 line	 with	 the	 recognition	 that	 potential	 service																																																									191	Diebold	(n	104)	214.	192	Eeckhout	(n	4)	11	emphasis	added.	193	Diebold	(n	104)	213	emphasis	added,	footnotes	ommited.	194	ibid	178.	195	ibid	221.	196	ibid	234.	197	ibid	230–231.	
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																																																								198	Molinuevo	(n	92)	105;	118.	199	Huerta-Goldman	(n	180)	265–271.	200	Krajewski	and	Engelke	(n	182)	415–416;	EH	Leroux,	‘Eleven	Years	of	GATS	Case	Law:	What	Have	We	Learned?’	(2007)	10	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	749,	783;	more	generally,	Weiss	(n	118)	88.	201	DiMascio	 and	 Pauwelyn	 (n	 105)	 89;	 Andrew	 Mitchell,	 David	 Heaton	 and	 Caroline	 Henckels,	 Non-
Discrimination	 and	 the	 Role	 of	 Regulatory	 Purpose	 in	 International	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Law	 (Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2016)	forthcoming.	202	Jurgen	Kurtz,	The	WTO	and	International	Investment	Law:	Converging	Systems	 (Cambridge	University	Press	2016)	84–85.	203	Rudolf	Adlung,	‘International	Rules	Governing	Foreign	Direct	Investment	in	Services:	Investment	Treaties	versus	the	GATS’	(2016)	17	The	Journal	of	World	Investment	&amp;	Trade	47,	84.	
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Chapter	9	on	Investment	of	the	recently	concluded	Transpacific	Partnership204	is	of	 interest	here,	as	an	example	of	a	recent	plurilateral	 treaty	conferring	establishment	rights.	 It	 includes	 a	 provision	 that	 clarifies	 the	 instruments	 regulating	 the	 process	 of	establishment	of	investments	in	relation	to	prospective	investors.	So,	how	is	the	attempt	to	make	an	investment	treated	in	TPP?		Like	the	US	Model	BIT,	it	defines	investment	widely,	but	covered	investments	are	restricted	to	those	already	established,	acquired	or	expanded.205	However,	similar	to	the	US	 Model	 BIT	 and	 NAFTA,	 the	 standards	 are	 applicable	 to	 measures	 relating	 to	investors.206	The	national	 treatment	and	MFN	provisions	are	 identical	 to	 the	US	Model	BIT,	 covering	 both	 investors	 and	 investments	 and	 the	 establishment,	 acquisition	 and	expansion	phases.207	It	also	sets	out	non-conforming	measures,	which	are	exempt	from	the	application	of	national	treatment	and	MFN.	The	 definition	 of	 investor	 also	 covers	 an	 investor	 that	 “attempts	 to	 make”	investments.	The	US	BIT	2004	model	had	introduced	this.	Douglas	criticized	the	use	of	the	expression	in	the	following	terms:	 	Difficult	 questions	 might	 arise	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 ‘attempt’	 must	 be	 bona	 fide	 or	reasonably	capable	of	success.	If	there	was	a	clear	prohibition	of	foreign	investment	in	 a	municipal	 legislation,	 could	 a	 national	 or	 enterprise	 nevertheless	 ‘attempt	 to	make’	 an	 investment	 in	 that	 sector	 and	 thereby	 attract	 the	 relevant	 minimum	standards	of	treatment?208		The	 indeterminateness	 in	 the	 definition,	 criticised	 by	 Douglas,	 is	 partially	addressed	 in	 TPP.	 The	TPP	 adds	 and	 clarifies	 that	 “an	 investor	 ‘attempts	 to	make’	 an	investment	 when	 that	 investor	 has	 taken	 concrete	 action	 or	 actions	 to	 make	 an	
investment,	 such	 as	 channelling	 resources	 or	 capital	 in	 order	 to	 set	 up	 a	 business,	 or	applying	 for	 permits	 or	 licenses.”209	This	 draws	 on	 the	 Chilean	 practice	 in	 their	investment	 chapters	 in	 the	 FTAs	 with	 Colombia210	and	 Peru211	and	 also	 in	 the	 recent	Pacific	Alliance	Investment	Treaty.212	There	are	also	enforcement	related	issues	that	will	be	dealt	with	in	the	next	papers.213	Anyway,	one	can	note	the	resemblance	to	the	GATS`	approach	on	potential	service	suppliers.																																																									204	Concluded	4	October	2015	<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text>		accessed	8	June	2016	205	art	9.1	206	art	9.2	(1	a)	207	art	9.4	(1);	art	9.5	(1)	On	the	meaning	of	like	circumstances,	the	TPP	contains	a	footnote	stating	that	it	“depends	 on	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 including	 whether	 the	 relevant	 treatment	 distinguishes	between	investors	or	investments	on	the	basis	of	legitimate	public	welfare	objectives.”	art	9.4	fn	14	208	Zachary	Douglas,	The	International	Law	of	Investment	Claims	(CUP	2009)	138.	209	art	9.1	fn	12	210	art	9.28	fn	18	and	19	211	art	11.28	fns	15	and	16	212	art	10.1	fns	4	and	5	213	For	instance,	an	interesting	provision	that	clarifies	it	is	art	9.28	[4]:	“for	claims	alleging	the	breach	of	an	 obligation	 under	 Section	 A	with	respect	to	an	attempt	to	make	an	investment,	 the	 only	 damages	 that	may	 be	 awarded	 are	 those	 that	 the	 claimant	 has	 proven	 were	 sustained	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 make	 the	investment,	 provided	 that	 the	 claimant	 also	 proves	 that	 the	 breach	 was	 the	 proximate	 cause	 of	 those	damages.”	See		
SIEL	Biennial	Conference		Johannesburg,	South	Africa	7-9	July	2016				
	 32	
Some	are	cautious	to	conclude	that	there	is	more	convergence	from	the	fact	that	investment	 is	 being	 negotiated	 in	 trade	 treaties	 such	 as	 the	 TPP:	 in	 NAFTA,	 as	 the	archetype	 of	 such	 a	model,	 both	 paths	 have	 remained	 separate.214	In	 the	 case	 of	 TPP,	there	are	indeed	some	references	from	the	chapter	of	cross-border	trade	in	services	to	the	chapter	of	investments.215	But	other	treaty	initiatives	have	shown	a	more	integrated	perspective,	at	least	with	regard	to	the	entry	of	investors,	as	will	be	seen.		
B) Extending	Market	Access	The	 issue	 of	 the	 coverage	 of	 investments	 in	 services	 in	 recent	 regional	 trade	agreements	 has	 been	 solved	 in	 several	 different	 ways:	 sometimes	 the	 obligations	overlap	 and	 are	 contained	 in	 both	 the	 investment	 and	 the	 services	 chapters,216	sometimes	 there	 is	 an	 exclusion	 of	 services	 from	 the	 investment	 chapter,217	or	 an	exclusion	of	investments	in	services	from	the	services	chapter.218		The	solutions	adopted	by	the	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	–	CETA,	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 Canada,	 are	 representative	 of	 a	 new	 trend.	Firstly,	 it	 is	 noticed	 that	 it	 replicates	 the	wide	definition	of	 investment,	 clarifying	 that	covered	 investments	are	those	that	are	made	 in	accordance	with	the	applicable	 law	at	that	 time.219	Apart	 from	 sector	 exclusions	 (airlines,	 audiovisual,	 culture…),	 it	 provides	for	the	possibility	of	non-conforming	measures.220	Secondly,	it	is	also	applied	to	investors.	And	the	investor’s	definition	includes	also	those	who	“seek	to	make”,	similar	to	NAFTA:	investor	means	a	Party,	a	natural	person	or	an	enterprise	of	a	Party,	other	than	a	branch	or	a	representative	office,	 that	seeks	to	make,	 is	making	or	has	made	an	investment	in	the	territory	of	the	other	Party.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 investor	 is	 regulated	 in	 a	 converged	manner	 using	 a	 structure	 of	 market	 access	 commitments.	 The	 following	 language	 is	used:	 Section	2:	Establishment	of	Investments																																																										214	Wu	(n	12)	208.	215	See	eg	art	10.2	(2)	a	216	An	example	are	chs	7	and	8	of	the	Japan-Singapore	Economic	Partnership	Agreement.	217	An	example	of	which	is	arts	22	and	32	of	the	EFTA-Chile	FTA,	which	regulates	FDI	in	services	within	the	 Services	 Section)	 See	 Federico	 Ortino,	 ‘Public	 Services,	 Investment	 Liberalization	 and	 Protection’,	
Regulation	of	Foreign	Investment,	vol	Volume	21	(World	Scientific	2012)	397.	218	Carsten	Fink	and	Martín	Molinuevo,	‘East	Asian	Free	Trade	Agreements	in	Services:	Key	Architectural	Elements’	(2008)	11	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	263,	279–286.	219	art	 8.1.	 As	 to	 measures	 affecting	 both	 the	 moment	 of	 establishment	 and	 afterwards,	 it	 is	 worth	mentioning	 fn	 4	 of	 art	 8.2:	 “For	 greater	 certainty,	 a	 Party	may	maintain	measures	with	 respect	 to	 the	establishment	or	acquisition	of	a	covered	investment	and	continue	to	apply	such	measures	to	the	covered	investment	after	it	has	been	established	or	acquired.”	220	art	8.15	
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Article	8.4:	Market	Access		1.	 Neither	 Party	 shall	 adopt	 or	 maintain	 with	 regard	 to	 market	 access	 through	
establishment	by	an	investor	of	a	Party,	either	on	the	basis	of	its	entire	territory	or	on	the	basis	of	the	territory	of	a	national,	provincial,	territorial,	regional	or	local	level	of	government,	measures	that:	…	Arts	 8.6	 and	 8.7	 extend	 national	 treatment	 and	 MFN	 to	 establishment	 and	expansion	but	exclude	the	former	from	ISDS	(art.	8.18).	This	is	the	main	difference	from	the	 approach	of	TPP.	The	CETA	Services	Chapter	9,	 as	 expected,	 applies	 only	 to	 cross	border	services.		It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 competence	 to	 negotiate	 treaties	 with	establishment	rights	was	already	within	the	competence	of	the	European	Union,	applied,	though,	 in	 a	 fragmented	 manner.221	As	 already	 mentioned,	 a	 focus	 on	 market	 access	constitutes	a	 trend	 that	moves	away	 from	discrimination.	 It	has	been	pointed	out	 that	European	 Union	 case	 law	 has	 gone	 “beyond	 discrimination”	 towards	 an	 analysis	 of	whether	 a	 measure	 prevents	 or	 impedes	 market	 access	 so	 that	 that	 neutral	 non-discriminatory	 regulation	may	 be	 considered	 a	 restriction	 to	 trade	 in	 services,	 unless	justified.222	This	move,	 evident	 in	CETA,	might	 illustrate	 an	 evolving	 international	practice.	Market	access	provisions	 inside	 investment	or	establishment	chapters	had	also	been	a	feature	 in	 some	 treaties,223	such	 as	 the	 Cariforum-EU	 EPA224	and	 the	 EU-Singapore	FTA. 225 	The	 latter	 have	 adopted	 different	 concepts	 such	 as	 “establishment”	 or	“commercial	presence”	located	in	different	sections	of	the	treaties.		This	has	been	coupled	with	 the	 introduction	of	more	 flexibilities	on	 investment	regulation.	 In	 this	 regard,	 there	 is	 the	 incorporation	 of	 GATS	 art.	 XIV	 into	 investment	treaties	 and	 in	 the	 investment	 chapters	 of	 the	 China-New	 Zealand	 FTA,226	of	 the	 FTA	between	 Switzerland	 and	 Japan227	and	 in	 the	 EU-Singapore	 FTA.228	However,	 some	believe	 that	 a	 closed-exception	 type	 of	 article	 does	 not	 seem	 necessary	 in	 IIAs	 since	there	 is	 national	 treatment	 subject	 to	 particular	 listed	 exceptions.229	In	 addition,	 the																																																									221	Filippo	Fontanelli	and	Giuseppe	Bianco,	 ‘Converging	towards	NAFTA:	An	Analysis	of	FTA	Investment	Chapters	 in	 the	European	Union	and	the	United	States’	 (2014)	50	Stanford	 Journal	of	 International	Law	211,	225.	222	Piet	 Eeckhout,	 ‘Constitutional	 Concepts	 for	 Free	 Trade	 in	 Services’	 in	 Joanne	 Scott	 and	 Gráinne	 De	Búrca	(eds),	The	EU	and	the	WTO:	legal	and	constitutional	aspects	(Hart	2001)	216.	223	Molinuevo	(n	92)	91.	224	Using	 the	 concept	 of	 “commercial	 presence”	 see	 art	 67	 of	 the	 Economic	 Partnership	 Agreement	between	the	CARIFORUM	States	and	the	European	Community,	signed	15	October	2008.		
225	Using	the	concept	of	“establishment”	see	arts	8.8(d)	and	8.10	of	EU-Singapore	Free	Trade	Agreement,	authentic	 text	 as	 of	 May	 2015,	 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961>	 accessed	 8	June	2016	226	Barton	 Legum	 and	 Ioana	 Petculescu,	 ‘GATT	 Article	 XX	 and	 International	 Investment	 Law’	 in	World	Trade	Forum	(ed),	Prospects	in	International	Investment	Law	and	Policy	(CUP	2013)	344–345.	227	Céline	Lévesque,	 ‘The	 Inclusion	of	GATT	Article	XX	Exceptions	 in	 IIAs:	A	Potentially	Risky	Policy’	 in	World	Trade	Forum	(ed),	Prospects	in	International	Investment	Law	and	Policy	(CUP	2013)	369.	228	art	9.3	(3)	229	Legum	and	Petculescu	(n	226)	354.	
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absence	 of	 an	 article	 has	 arguably	 given	 flexibility	 to	 tribunals	 in	 interpreting	 the	standard	 of	 like	 circumstances,	 so	 that	 their	 role	 becomes	 more	 limited.230	It	 is	debatable	 whether	 this	 practice	 also	 intends	 to	 import	 the	 WTO	 jurisprudence	interpreting	these	provisions.231	The	 recognition	of	 the	 shortcomings	of	 the	GATS	 is	 generally	due	 to	 its	 limited	scheduling,	 result	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 positive	 list	 approach.	 Liberalisation	 BITs	 and	negative	list	Preferential	Trade	Agreements	–	PTAs	have	a	larger	sectoral	scope.232	The	level	 of	 obligations	 on	 the	 entry	 of	 investments	 of	 some	BITs	has	 exceeded	what	was	covered	by	the	GATS.233	Careful	analysis	shows	that	the	US	has	maintained	consistency	in	exclusion	from	its	BITs	and	GATS	commitments;	on	the	other	hand,	its	partners	have	undertaken	 more	 national	 treatment	 commitments	 than	 in	 the	 GATS.234	It	 has	 been	argued	 that	 a	 progressive,	 flexible	 and	 incremental	 approach235	focussed	 on	 the	GATS	would	be	the	most	appropriate	and	pragmatic	way	to	deal	with	investment	liberalisation	in	the	world	trade	law	system.236		At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 is	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	 regional	 initiatives	 such	 as	Trade	 in	 Services	 Agreement	 –	 TISA	 and	 the	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	Partnership	–	TTIP.237	The	methodological	option	here	 is	 to	wait	 for	 the	 conclusion	of	the	negotiations	to	analyse	current	provisions	related	to	the	entry	of	investors	in	those	agreements.	 It	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	 TTIP	 covers	 establishment,	 market	access	 and	 service	 providers	 (foreign	 investors)	 that	 “seek	 to	 supply	 services”.	 As	 to	TISA,	since	Mode	3	will	be	covered,	it	would	be	exciting	to	see	the	interplay	of	the	new	scheduling	 techniques	 of	 commitments	 in	 investment	 in	 services.	 These	 are	 the	scheduling	of	the	status	quo	of	restrictions	and	the	ratchet	clause	to	lock-in	liberalizing	investment	measures	in	the	service	sector.	In	any	case,	it	seems	fair	to	accept	that	the	positive	or	negative	listings	are	mere	technicalities,	 which,	 if	 carefully	 crafted,	 may	 provide	 the	 same	 level	 of	 policy	flexibilities.238	The	 introduction	 of	 establishment	 rights	 and	 market	 access	 regulation	constitutes	 a	 move	 towards	 a	 more	 liberal	 theory	 of	 investments	 on	 entry,	 which	arguably	delivers	more	economic	benefits.239	If	 this	 is	 coupled	with	 carefully	designed	policy	 reservations	 and	 justifications,	 it	 provides	 a	 good	 parameter	 to	 international	economic	law	agreements.																																																									230	Lévesque	(n	227)	367–70.	231	Kurtz,	 ‘On	 the	 Evolution	 and	 Slow	 Convergence	 of	 International	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Law’	 (n	 16)	113.	232	Molinuevo	(n	92)	130.	233	Wimmer	(n	137)	116.	234	Rudolf	Adlung	and	Martín	Molinuevo,	 ‘Bilateralism	in	Services	Trade:	 Is	There	Fire	Behind	the	(Bit-)	Smoke?’	(2008)	11	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	365,	372.	235	Jorge	A	Huerta	Goldman,	‘Domestic,	Regional	and	Multilateral	Investment	Liberalization’,	Regulation	of	





6. CONCLUSION		 To	 sum	 up,	 this	 paper	 has	 shown	 that	 international	 law	 regulates	 the	 entry	 of	foreign	investments	using	rules	from	different	international	regimes.	By	comparing	the	provisions	 in	 the	 regimes	 of	 trade	 and	 investment	 law,	 this	 paper	 tried	 to	 argue	 that	there	 is	more	 liberalization	 in	 investment	 treaties	as	well	as	 there	 is	more	 investment	regulation	 in	 the	 GATS	 than	 commonly	 thought.	 	 Within	 the	 background	 of	 general	international	 law,	 the	 content	 of	 conventional	 rules	 is	 drafted	 using	 a	 wide	 array	 of	languages,	which	share	common	features	and	point	to	some	conceptual	convergence.		The	 varied	 techniques	 used	 to	 regulate	 the	 entry	 of	 foreign	 investments	 and	investors	in	services	are	reflected	in	different	clauses.	Consequently,	the	categorization	of	investment	treaties	as	protection-driven	as	opposed	to	liberalisation-driven	may	not	describe	with	precision	their	character.	But	no	matter	how	divergent	the	goals	of	trade	and	 investment	 treaties	may	 arguably	 be,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 entry	 of	 investments	 and	investors,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 their	 provisions	 leads	 to	 particularly	similar	results.	For	 instance,	 the	concept	of	commercial	presence	 in	the	GATS	 includes	aspects	equivalent	to	the	so-called	establishment	of	foreign	direct	investments.	Also,	the	interpretation	of	GATS	rules	as	covering	potential	service	suppliers	bear	a	resemblance	to	concepts	already	present	in	BIT	practice	in	relation	to	investors	that	seek	to	invest.	This	 paper	 unassumingly	 concludes	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 provisions	 of	 entry	 of	investments	 in	 services,	 there	 are	 some	 signs	 of	 an	 increasing	 conceptual	 and	substantive	 convergence	 of	 rules.	 Firstly,	 one	 ponders	 whether	 some	 concepts	 still	provide	 a	 useful	 taxonomy	 to	 explain	 the	 regulation	 of	 entry.	 The	way	 the	 admission	clauses	 evolved	 to	 establishment	 clauses	 in	 some	 treaties	 shows	 that	 the	 difference	between	them,	while	less	radical	and	of	limited	practical	relevance,	may	indicate	a	step	towards	 a	 convergence	 with	 international	 trade	 law.	 Moreover,	 measures	 tend	 to	equally	 apply	 to	 both	 the	 entry	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 investments,	 thus	 affecting	 new	investments/investors	and	those	already	established.	Secondly,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 trend	 towards	 treaty	 language	 granting	more	 entry	rights	 and	 commitments.	 This	 was	 done	 by	 the	 progressive	 introduction	 of	 national	treatment	 for	 entry	 rights,	 the	 expansion	 of	 services	 coverage	 in	 Mode	 3	 and	 the	recognition	and	clarification	of	the	rights	to	potential	investors.	The	increasing	number	of	 ITs	 containing	 establishment	 rights	 is	 noted	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 the	 new	 mega-regionals.	Thirdly,	 there	 has	 also	 been	 a	 disposition	 to	 include	 provisions	 related	 to	 the	entry	 of	 investors	 coming	 from	 the	 international	 trade	 law	world	 into	 the	 investment	law	 arena.	 The	 introduction	 of	 the	 GATS	 founding	 concept	 of	 market	 access	 in	 the	investment	 chapter	 of	 CETA	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 example.	 This	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 by	 a	clear	and	almost	literal	adoption	of	GATS-style	language.	The	open	questions	are	to	what	extent	the	GATS	case	law	would	be	resorted	to	in	investment	treaties	with	reference	to	
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provisions	such	as	market	access	and	justifications.	The	substantive	convergence	of	the	rules	related	to	entry	of	investments	in	treaty	making	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 promising	 sign.	 It	 would	 avoid	 inconsistencies	 and	 allow	 for	clearer	flexibilities.	
